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The challenge for the German security policy in the 21st century

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The aim of this study was firstly to identify the causes of the paradoxical defeats of the strong actor in asymmetric wars and secondly the development of recommendations how Germany could better prepare itself for future asymmetric wars.

With regard to the first part of the question, the surprising defeats of the strong actor in asymmetric wars the result of analysis are the following: The strong actors loose asymmetric wars primarily for two reasons. Firstly because they use the wrong strategy in their fight against the weak actor and secondly because the weak actor gets support from abroad. Furthermore, the analyzes suggests that the unilateral training of the officer corps for the war of movement with mechanized forces is the prime reason why the strong actor frequently opts for wrong strategy and is thus the cause for the increasing number of defeats of the strong actor in the asymmetric wars over the last 60 years.

Based on the results of the research to find the causes for the paradoxical defeats of the strong actor in asymmetric wars proposals for a better preparation of Germany were developed in the second part of the paper. The reasoning for this analysis was that Germany needs on the one hand to be able to successfully apply the "Hearts and Minds" strategy and on the other hand prevent any support for the insurgents from abroad if it wants to have chance of winning an asymmetric war.

As for the preventing of foreign support for the insurgents, the research in this paper came to the conclusion that before an intervention, a detailed, all inclusive study of the region were the intervention is to take place should be carried out in order to avoid acting against the interests of neighboring countries which could otherwise be induced to support the insurgents. In addition the analysis conducted in this paper shows that it would also be highly advisable for Germany to intervene in asymmetric wars only as member of large coalitions.

As for enabling Germany to successfully apply the "Hearts and Minds" research performed for this paper showed that reforms in the Army, the coordination of the different government branches and the deployment of civilian personnel would need to be performed. The Bundeswehr for example would need a complete reorientation from an army trained and equipped for mechanized warfare to one trained and equipped for asymmetric warfare. The necessary reforms would, among other things include an augmentation of the infantry component of the army and an increased emphasize on foreign language and intercultural awareness training for the soldiers. Another important area of reform would be the officer corps, which would need to be made aware and trained for the peculiarities of asymmetric warfare in order to enable it to select the right strategies and tactics and implement them successfully. In the case of the air force such a conversion of the Bundeswehr to an asymmetric warfare fighting force would, inter alia, include the increased procurement of transport aircraft, helicopters and drones as well as ground attack airplanes.

In addition to the reforms in the army further reforms in the coordination of the government would be necessary in order to enable Germany to successfully implement the "Hearts and Minds" - approach. A central agency for long-term planning and coordination of foreign missions would need to be established in order to enable the German government to coordinate future interventions more effectively. The analysis carried out in this thesis suggest that the best location for such a planning and coordinating body would be in the Federal Chancellery because it is the only bureaucracy within the German government that can force the other ministries and agencies into a collaborative work approach which is essential for success in an asymmetric war.

As an important addition to the described reforms in the army and in the planning and coordination, it would also be advisable if Germany would create a sufficiently large standing contingent of civilian emergency services for the support of reconstruction in the context of an asymmetric war. The creation of this quota would in this case be accompanied by a reform of personnel system within the public service that would make an overseas deployment of officers and employees as a condition for a further their career. Furthermore, it would be advisable that this program would be supported by the mobilization of reservists, retirees, immigrants and students.